Named after the First World War Admiral, Maximilian Graf von Spee, KMS Admiral Graf Spee was one the ‘Deutschland’ class of three armoured ships (panzerschiff) designed to protect Germany’s Baltic trade. They had an armament of 28cm (11 inch) guns, powerful enough to defeat the envisaged enemy and a speed of 26-27 knots, great enough to out-run ships with superior armament. The ship was launched by the daughter of the ship’s namesake, in 1934 and commissioned on 6 January 1936. Proudly displayed on the control tower of the ship was the battle honour “Coronel”, Admiral Spee’s victory in 1914. The panzerschiffs’ sea-keeping qualities were poor, a factor of the amount of equipment crammed into them, simply overloading the hull. This was to prove a key factor for Graf Spee in December 1939.
By 1934 it had been decided that the German Navy would follow a traditional sea power policy and a strong battle fleet was to be created. By 1948 this fleet would have comprised 8 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 3 panzerschiff, 16 cruisers, 2 aircraft carriers and about 270 U boats. In 1938 war with Britain was possible and Hitler ordered a speeding-up of the construction programme. At the same time a review of German naval strategy concluded that, even with the planned fleet, cruiser warfare against British merchant shipping was the only viable option and must be undertaken by all units.
British naval policy for the protection of merchant shipping was promulgated in January 1939 and stated “that traditional and well-proved methods” would be implemented. A system of adequately escorted convoys would be introduced and where this was not possible evasive routing and dispersal of shipping would be implemented. Cruisers would be concentrated in pairs at focal points where they could be supplemented by units of the main fleet if required.
At midday, Sunday 3 September 1939 when war was declared, Graf Spee under the command of Captain Hans Langsdorff, was in mid Atlantic Ocean cruising in calm seas, having sailed from Wilhelmshaven on 21 August. Following in her wake was the supply ship Altmark. The Royal Navy had placed a patrol from Greenland to Scotland, at the beginning of September, but this was far too late to detect the German ship.
In the immediate aftermath of WW I Captain Erich Raeder wrote the German Navy official history of surface raiders, drawing the prime conclusion that the raiders would have been more effective if their commanders had avoided action with British warship. As Supreme Commander of the German Navy in 1939 he was determined that his raiders would not make the same mistake and the German ‘Battle Instructions’ made it clear that combat, even against inferior naval forces was to be avoided.
Half a world away, HMS Achilles, one of New Zealand’s two cruisers, had sailed from Auckland on 29 August to join the Royal Navy’s America and West Indies Squadron in the Caribbean. On 2 September Achilles was ordered instead, to patrol the west coast of South America. The ship arrived on the 12th at Valparaiso and having fuelled and embarked fresh provisions, sailed the next day for what would be a six week patrol off the coasts of Chile, Peru and Ecuador.
Immediately prior to the outbreak of war the South Atlantic had been designated a separate station and the South America Division of the America and West Indies Squadron was transferred to the new station. The Division consisted of the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter and a sister ship to Achilles, HMS Ajax. Over the next few weeks the Division was augmented by another 8 inch gun cruiser, Cumberland. On the 2nd October Achilles was also ordered to join the Division.
Increasing the strength of the South America Division was partly due to the importance of the trade from the area and partly because of a significant change in Admiralty policy for trade protection. Eight hunting groups were set-up to seek out and destroy enemy raiders. Most groups comprised two 8 inch gun cruisers, which were deemed capable of destroying a panzerschiff. The hunting group off the South American coast was designated “Force G”, made up of Cumberland and Exeter. With these two cruisers absent hunting raiders there was a need to supplement Ajax on routine patrol and escort duties. Commodore Harwood in command of the Division now flew his broad pennant in Ajax.
Graf Spee’s primary operational area was the South Atlantic, but it was also authorised to operate in the Indian Ocean. For over three weeks after the outbreak of war Hitler tried to make peace with Britain and it was not until 26 September that Captain Langsdorff received orders to operate against British shipping. Shortly afterwards Admiral Raeder reiterated that raiders were not to enter into any action against British warships. Graf Spee’s first success was against the SS Clement off the coast of Brazil on 30 September. As Clement had got off a message about being attacked by a raider, Captain Langsdorff sent a message in plain language asking that the boats of Clement be picked up.
Four more ships fell, victim to Graf Spee over the next three weeks. Then to create confusion, Captain Langsdorff moved into the Indian Ocean, sinking the steamer Africa Star on 15 November and stopping a neutral Dutch ship the following day. Satisfied that the British would think that the raider was now in the Indian Ocean, he returned to the South Atlantic.
On 24 November Captain Langsdorff told his officers that it was time for the ship to return to Germany and that he had decided to revise the tactics employed to date. Because the ship was returning to be refitted and it was unlikely that another German ship would be in the area for some time, Graf Spee would not avoid action with enemy ships, but would meet them, even at the risk of losing the ship.
Back in the South Atlantic Graf Spee sank the Doric Star on 2 December and the Tairoa on the third. Commodore Harwood estimated that the raider could be off Rio de Janeiro on the morning of 12 December, the River Plate on the morning of the 13th. Believing that the key area was the River Plate, he decided to concentrate the three ships he had available, Ajax, Exeter and Achilles, there. Cumberland was undertaking routine maintenance at the Falkland Islands.
Commodore Henry “Bobby” Harwood had been on the staff of the Senior Officer’s War Course at Greenwich between 1934 and 1936, where he lectured in tactics. One of his innovative developments was how best to engage the new German ‘pocket battleships’, using separated divisions of cruisers that would force the enemy to split his fire or only engage one division at a time.
At 6.00am on 12 December the three ships made a rendezvous off the River Plate and at midday the Commodore signalled his intentions:
My Policy with three cruisers in company versus one pocket battleship - attack at once by day or night. By day act as two divisions, First Division and Exeter diverged to permit flank marking. First Division will concentrate gunfire. By night ships will normally remain in company open order.
On the morning of the 13th the ships went to dawn action stations as usual and practised the Commodore’s intended method of attacking a pocket battleship, after which the crews stood down.
Shortly after 6.00am the ships were in line ahead when the signalman on watch in Ajax reported smoke on the port horizon. Exeter was ordered to investigate and two minutes later reported that the contact was a pocket battleship. Graf Spee was steering directly towards the three ships and opened fire. All ships ran up their battle ensigns and Achilles also hoisted the New Zealand flag. Graf Spee’s main threat was Exeter who had straddled her with the second salvo. The third landed close alongside, causing damage to the ship’s gunnery and steering communications as well as killing a number of men. About this time Exeter opened fire and straddled Graf Spee with the third salvo.
After seven minutes Graf Spee scored a hit on ‘B’ turret, immediately forward of Exeter’s bridge. This disabled the turret and swept the bridge with splinters, killing or wounding most of the men there and severed communications with the wheelhouse. Wounded in both legs and both eyes, the Captain was forced to move to the after control position, but even there orders had to be passed by a chain of sailors. Continuous hits and near misses hammered the ship and caused more casualties over the next five minutes.
Ajax and Achilles crossed to the opposite side of Graf Spee and opened fire, the fire being returned by Graf Spee’s secondary armament. By 6.31am the range was down to 13,000 yards - the optimum for the 6 inch cruisers - and they were rightly seen to be a threat by Graf Spee, which shifted target to Ajax. At this range the ships were straddling each other and both altered course, opening the range and Graf Spee again concentrated on Exeter. The British ship had only four of her six guns working, but despite the hammering she was receiving she managed to hit Graf Spee twice.
Five minutes later all of Exeter’s guns were out of action and Graf Spee again shifted target to the light cruisers and at 6.40am landed a near miss by Achilles. This killed several men, some of a 4 inch gun’s crew on the upper deck and others in the director control tower, besides wounding several, including Captain Parry. While the Director was not seriously damaged, it took some time to replace the dead and wounded and although the ship continued firing, it was ineffective.
At about 7.00am Graf Spee shifted fire again to Exeter, which was now engaging her with the after turret, in local control. Exeter’s fire was inaccurate and Graf Spee returned to the light cruisers. By 7.25am the range was down to 8,700 yards and the two ships were hitting Graf Spee, when Ajax received a hit on ‘X’ turret that also put ‘Y’ turret out of action.
The power to Exeter’s last turret failed and unable to keep up the high speed of the action, the ship turned away. But Graf Spee was beginning to suffer. One shell hit the top of the control tower and Langsdorff was wounded in his shoulder and arm by splinters and another below the control tower shortly afterwards, knocked him out for a few minutes. One hit was registered by a practice round fired by Achilles ‘B’ turret, killing two men, which came to rest in the warrant officers quarters.
While the two ships were hitting Graf Spee, remaining close to a powerful and active opponent was risky. With Exeter out of action and Ajax having two turrets knocked out and short of ammunition; while Graf Spee still had full speed and all her armament firing, Commodore Harwood decided to break off the action and take up a shadowing position.
Graf Spee continued westward while Captain Langsdorff considered his position. The ship had received 23 hits and while none threatened the ship directly, a hit in the bow impinged on the already marginal seaworthiness of the ship and the loss of the freshwater plant was a major impediment for a long sea journey. Thirty-seven men had been killed and another 57 wounded, including of course, Langsdorff himself. Additionally the ship had fired over 70 percent of it’s 11 inch ammunition. After touring the ship he decided to enter the neutral port of Montevideo to make good as much of the damage as possible. The ship anchored in the harbour shortly after midnight and a new type of battle over the fate of the German ship now began.
Captain Langsdorff asked to stay in the port for two weeks to repair the battle damage and at first the British Ambassador argued that the ship was essentially seaworthy and that the stay should be limited to 24 hours. The Uruguayan authorities decided to permit the ship to stay for 4 days. The nearest reinforcements for Commodore Harwood were over five days away and he asked the Ambassador to do what he could to delay Graf Spee sailing. While the Uruguayan’s were sympathetic, it was reiterated that Graf Spee had to leave the port by 8.00pm on 17 December. In addition to his diplomatic efforts, the Ambassador was also spreading disinformation. One classic example was requesting the Argentine authorities, in plain language over a telephone line known to be tapped by the Germans, to arrange fuel for two battle cruisers expected to arrive the following day.
Captain Langsdorff had three alternatives: He could try to break out through the British line, or he could let Graf Spee be interned, or he could scuttle the ship. Berlin was advised of these options and responded with the order that he was not to allow the ship to be interned. Perhaps a key factor in the Captain’s decision making process was revealed in a comment made to one of his crew later, “better a thousand live young men than a thousand dead heroes”. Early in the morning of 17 December Langsdorff decided to scuttle the ship.
The final decision made, the destruction of key equipment was undertaken during the forenoon, including the fire control system, but inexplicably, not the ship’s radar set. Preparations were made for the scuttling and during the day boats were called from Buenos Aires in nearby Argentina, which had a large German population and most of the officers and ratings were eventually taken there. Shortly after 6.00pm, with battle ensigns on both the fore and main masts, Graf Spee weighed anchor and proceeded out of harbour. About an hour after sailing and four miles off the coast, the ship stopped and at 7.54pm the first of the scuttling charges went off and Graf Spee began to settle on to the mud of the estuary.
That night Captain Langsdorff wrote three letters, one to the German Minister, one to his wife and one to his parents. In the first he explained his actions in scuttling the ship and his feelings as the person bearing sole responsibility for its fate. Included was the statement that “For a captain with a sense of honour, it goes without saying, that his personal fate cannot be separated from that of his ship”. This done, he unfolded the ensign worn by Graf Spee during the battle, laid down on it and shot himself in the head.
A grateful sovereign made Commodore Harwood a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath and each of the Captains was made a companion of the same Order, while the Admiralty promoted Harwood to Rear Admiral. In February more awards were made to the crews of the ships for their actions during
the battle.
After the scuttling Ajax and Achilles resumed their patrol and a few days later proceeded to the Falklands where they sent working parties to help repair the damage on Exeter and spent Christmas. In the New Year Exeter proceeded to Britain for repairs while Ajax visited Montevideo and Achilles Buenos Aires. The ships were well received at both places and when by chance some Achilles sailors met with some from Graf Spee ashore, there was no animosity between them. At the end of January Achilles departed for home, arriving to what amounted to a state welcome in Auckland. There was a civic luncheon in the Auckland Town Hall, during which Mr Tai Mitchell presented Captain Parry with a Maori cloak on behalf of the Maori people.
In early 1940, in collusion with British Naval Intelligence, a Uruguayan citizen purchased the hulk of Graf Spee. In this way the British were able to inspect the wreck first-hand and remove some vital pieces of equipment, such as the radar set, fire control equipment and a torpedo war head which had been set as a scuttling charge, but which had not exploded. In all about 30 tons of equipment was removed and shipped back to Britain.