Michael Wynd looks at the German perspective on the Battle of the River Plate. He explores why was the GRAF SPEE operating in the South Atlantic in December 1939 and, why did Captain Langsdorff give battle instead of avoiding contact with the Royal Navy?
Attack Sea Communications
On 3 April 1939, a directive was issued by the Ober Kommando Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces) that an attack would be made against Poland any time after 1 September. One of the key tasks in German naval plans was to ‘attack the enemy’s sea communications.’ The Germans had learned the value of the commerce raiders in the First World War. A single vessel at large could force the Royal Navy to commit its vessels in order to hunt down the raider.
GRAF SPEE left her home port, Wilhelmshaven, in August 1939 before the war started. As well, sixteen U-boats and the SPEE’s sister ship DEUTSCHLAND also put to sea; there they could then begin attacking Allied shipping once war was declared.
GRAF SPEE’s commanding officer, Kapitän zur See Hans Langsdorf, was an experienced veteran of the Imperial German Navy; he had fought at the Battle of Jutland in 1916. He took his ship along the coasts of Denmark and Norway and up into the Arctic Circle. Then by sailing north of Iceland the SPEE reached the Atlantic unsighted by the Royal Navy. GRAF SPEE then headed into the South Atlantic, meeting up with her designated tanker/supply ship ALTMARK on 13 September.
German Secret Naval Supply
The German Secret Naval Supply Service had been organised before the war and functioned out of neutral ports. German supply ships were loaded with critical supplies for the raiders and they would meet in designated areas. At this stage transferring supplies at sea depended on boat transfer, or two ships ‘rafting’ close together as the system of high-line transfer between ships sailing in parallel had not yet been developed.
Initially, the GRAF SPEE was ordered not to sink any vessels as they waited ‘to see whether the Western Powers, and especially France, were seriously going to become involved in military activities against Germany.’ This restriction was lifted on 23 September 1939 and Graf Spee sank her first victim on the 30th. At this point Langsdorf did not know where enemy warships were—nor did the Royal Navy know his position either.
Subterfuge and Disguise
In order to fool opponents the GRAF SPEE added an extra funnel and turret. False radio signals were also sent and the raider constantly used different code names and other details to confuse the Allied signal intelligence service. A false bow wave was painted to make the ship appear faster than she was and hopefully confuse enemy gunnery officers.
Using other nation’s flags was also fair game for the ship. On 5 October she captured the SS NEWTON BEACH while flying the French flag. She also employed this ruse when approaching merchant ships as in the case of SS TREVANION which was sunk on 22 October 1939. ALTMARK was fortunate that in October it also managed to fool aircraft from HMS ARK ROYAL that she was an American vessel. As November came, Langsdorff told the ship’s company that they would not engage with Royal Navy warships but sink only merchant vessels. His view was that any attack on a vessel that could shoot back would carry great risk for a ship so far from a friendly port.
Destination River Plate
After sinking of the two freighters DORIC STAR and TAIROA near South Africa on 2 December 1939 Langsdorf, uncertain about what radio message the ship had managed to transmit, chose to move westward towards South America. He thought that the Royal Navy warships had been fooled into searching the Indian Ocean. In addition he chose to go west because of the valuable trade coming out of the River Plate from Argentina and Uruguay. He also wanted a major ‘victory before returning to Germany in January 1940’ and intercepting a convoy off the River Plate would give him that victory.
Langsdorff reached this decision about the same time Harwood had reasoned that the GRAF SPEE would select the River Plate as a hunting ground for merchant ships. This was not a result of code breaking or intelligence guesses, but simple deduction on the action to take. For both men, it would prove the most critical decision they would make as naval officers.
GRAF SPEE sank the TAIROA on 3 December and refuelled from the ALTMARK on 6 December. ALTMARK’s supply of fuel oil was low and she was ordered to return to Germany with the 300 prisoners aboard. Langsdorf had now cut himself off from his only friendly source of supply, trusting that the tanker TACOMA would reach him from Montevideo in order to refuel the ship.
On the morning of 13 December 1939 while pursuing the French liner FORMOSE the topmasts of a British cruiser were spotted southeast of the ship. Upon sighting, battle stations were ordered and the battle ensign was hoisted.
Langsdorf’s Tactical Choice
Langsdorf, who up to this moment had been very careful to avoid any engagement with British warships now threw caution to the wind and chose to give battle. His peculiar tactical choice was to close rapidly and destroy the enemy warship before they could manoeuvre out of range of his 11-inch guns, sacrificing the advantage of the range his guns had over the cruisers. He was aware that the maximum speed of the Graf Spee had been reduced to 25 knots due to ‘tropical growths on the hull.’
The Germans identified the cruiser as HMS EXETER but assumed the other two vessels were destroyers. The presumption was that these three warships were screening a convoy. Langsdorf’s tactical plan was now put into action. The GRAF SPEE increased speed and closed on the EXETER, expecting to be led towards the convoy. Instead, he had fallen into the trap set by Commodore Harwood and was now facing three enemy cruisers which were divided into two divisions.
The initial German gunnery was excellent, straddling the EXETER on the third salvo but Harwood’s trap complicated the German fire control. A commander cannot afford to leave a warship unengaged to concentrate fire on one vessel. Therefore Langsdorf ordered gunfire to be shifted from the EXETER to ACHILLES and AJAX reducing the effectiveness of the salvos on the British ships.
As EXETER dropped out of the battle due to the damage inflicted by the GRAF SPEE, full attention could now be given to the two light cruisers. But the British frustrated the German gunners by ‘chasing salvoes’. This involved sailing toward close shell splashes and away from distant ones. This tactic worked for about fifteen minutes until the range was re-established. GRAF SPEE then managed to get hits on both cruisers but Langsdorf was focused on finishing off EXETER. This tunnel vision allowed Harwood to order ACHILLES and AJAX to close into the GRAF SPEE. The 5.9-inch guns’ fire began to falter due to combat stress as the turrets were sustaining damage inflicted by the British guns. Despite the fact that all the German ship’s guns were still operable they were not hitting their targets effectively.
Then at the height of the battle GRAF SPEE lost the use of the central director as casualties mounted in the control tower. This development limited Langsdorf’s options. The Graf Spee fired its torpedoes but these were spotted by AJAX’s aircraft and were avoided. However, the high rate of fire forced Harwood to break off the battle after 90 minutes of intense combat.
GRAF SPEE Wounded
The Graf Spee was damaged and needed to effect repairs. Thought was given to attempt to return to Germany but the battle damage had left the GRAF SPEE in an unseaworthy state to undertake such a voyage. Langsdorf did not try and outrun the British cruisers as his fuel situation was serious. Running at high speed during battle rapidly depletes the fuel supply. Langsdorf had sent his tanker away and did not have a fuel supply readily available.
Langsdorf disregarded the tactical and strategic problems and seemed only to be concerned with his ship and his men. As Graf Spee approached Montevideo Langsdorff attempted a ruse using a merchant ship to distract the British cruisers now shadowing his ship. It failed and precious 11-inch ammunition was expended to keep ACHILLES and AJAX at a respectful distance.
It was obvious that the GRAF SPEE could not fight its way out of trouble with its limited ammunition supply. Even a successful breakout would be fruitless as the Royal Navy would send a stream of warships and the destruction of the ship would be certain. The only option achievable was to reach the nearest neutral port. Langsdorf chose Montevideo as he thought that neutral Uruguay would intern the ship. His thinking was driven by the fact that the enemy cruisers were herding him towards this port as the initiative was now with the Royal Navy. After dropping anchor in Montevideo, Langsdorf asked the Uruguay government for two weeks to repair his ship but was only given 72 hours much to the satisfaction of the British Consulate and Royal Navy but to Langsdorf’s distress.
Langsdorff Isolated
The only certainties Langsdorf could count on was that no assistance would be forthcoming, and the battle would resume once he left port. The German commander received a false report from his gunnery officer that had been circulated by British diplomats in Montevideo that HMS RENOWN and the aircraft carrier HMS ARK ROYAL had joined with the British cruisers off Montevideo. The German Naval Operations staff moreover failed Langsdorf in providing intelligence reports. This left him prey to rumours and conjecture as to the British forces arrayed outside the port. This deception campaign was a masterpiece of British counter-intelligence.
His plan to move to Buenos Aires another neutral port but that was further up-river from Montevideo. This plan was approved by the German naval command but he was not to let the warship be interned. Langsdorf called a council-of-war with his senior officers. The option of a fighting exit was dismissed because of the shallow waters of the harbour. Further battle damage could cause the ship to settle and run aground. Next, the move to Buenos Aires was rejected as it would only make the escape effort more difficult. Time was on the side of the Royal Navy who knew that at the conclusion of the 72 hour stay, the German ship would have to emerge from port into their guns. Under the neutrality laws, the Royal Navy could not carry out an attack on an enemy warship in a neutral port. Therefore the plan was made to scuttle the warship. When this was done, Langsdorf and the ship’s company went by small vessels to Buenos Aires. What confirmed this course of action was the accurate report that ARK ROYAL and RENOWN had reached Rio de Janeiro, 1800 kilometres away from Montevideo.
German Sailors Escape
Langsdorf committed suicide on the battle ensign he had fought under at the battle of Jutland. His concern for his ship and men allowed the Royal Navy to force him to sail, as he called it in his last letter, ‘into the trap of Montevideo’. One can speculate that it was an honourable way out for a commanding officer who had fared so inadequately in battle. The sinking of the DORIC STAR Langsdorf ‘regarded as his greatest success, but in the end was to prove fatal to him.’ The German sailors went into internment in Argentina but a number subsequently managed to get back to Germany, with the assistance of the Soviet Union.
The major factor in the defeat at the Battle of the River Plate was that Langsdorf had underestimated the ‘extraordinary willingness of British naval ships to run what ever risks seemed appropriate to fight it out regardless of losses in specific engagements.’ ‘When it came to actions in reality…the Royal Navy showed daring and skill. The destruction of the Graf Spee by British cruisers she outclassed was only the first spectacular instance.’ The moral effect of winning this battle clearly benefited the Allied cause, but also illustrated the ‘confusion over strategy and organisation in the German Navy.’
Michael Wynd